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KCON XI ESSAY INTRODUCTION
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION AND
ADHESION CONTRACTS IN THE AGE OF
DONALD TRUMP
PETER LINZER*
Remarks of Peter Uin.Zer on Receiving the
Lifetime Achievement Award from the
11t hInternational Contracts Conference (K-CON XI)
(Reised after Election Day, 2016)
When Colin Marks told me I was going to get the award I told him I
wanted to make a speech that I hoped would sum up forty years of contracts
teaching, but I never got around to writing it. So, I will content myself with
a short talk about something that has been troubling me for years-the role
of one-sided power in contracts, specifically in mass consumer contract-
and comment even more briefly about three essays in this issue of the St.
Magy's Law Journal authored by a talented panel that I had the pleasure to
moderate.
Before doing either, however, I want to tell you how much affection I
have for this annual conference with the somewhat pretentious name of the
International Contracts Conference, but which we all just call the K-CON.
It got its start about 2003 when Frank Snyder was surfing the Internet and
nearly fell off his board at the news that the City of Gloucester, in England,
was renovating an old mill as part of an urban renewal project.' Frank
Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. A.B., Cornell, 1960; J.D., Columbia,
1963. Reviser of 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 2010); Editorial Reviser,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
1. Peter Linzer, Hadley v. Baxendale and the Seamless Web fLaw, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 225,
225 (2005).
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quickly realized the mill in question was the one whose broken crankshaft
led to the contracts warhorse, Hadley v. Baxendale,2 dealing with the
foreseeability of consequential damages.3 He also realized the following
summer would be Hadley's 150th anniversary. "Let's put on a show!" cried
Frank, and decided to organize a contracts conference in Gloucester, in or
near the mill from Hadly.4  It was a great success,5 and we6 have been
holding them almost every year since. The first K-CON was the only one
held outside the United States so far, but we have increasingly had
participants from all over the world, and who knows, maybe we will hold
one in Mexico if President Trump's wall is not too high to scale.
When I was told of the award, the great Edith Piaf recording of La Vie
En Rose kept going through my mind. It is about life with a happy rose
coloring, and it seemed to fit my being given the award at the K-CON.7
What I like about the K-CONs is that they are comprised of a bunch of
contracts professors who just like the subject and like each other. At the
annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools (AALS),
people look at your badge to see if you are at a prestigious enough school
for them to be seen talking to you, while here we just hang out and listen to
each other talk about contracts. Some of the participants are from tonier
schools than others, and many are young, with just enough greybeards like
me to leaven the discussions. We listen to each other and learn from each
other. That is why I've rarely missed a K-CON, and why receiving this
award from my peers and friends means so much to me.
In teaching and writing about contracts I have become increasingly
concerned with disparate power and an ethos that assumes the fiction that
everyone has the same degree of sophistication and attention to detail, so
that if you cannot afford as good a lawyer as the other side, or did not read
the thirty page End User License Agreement linked next to the "I Agree"
box on your computer screen, that is your problem.' In the last few years
2. Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. Ch. 1854).
3. Id. at 145.
4. Ciy Event Marks Historic Law Case, GLOUCESTER CITIZEN, May 25, 2004, at 22.
5. I helped Frank to find speakers and was offered a free trip for my (very modest) troubles, but
was already behind on writing the Revised Corbin on Contracts Volume Six, and stayed home. I did not
get the book done for five more years, so obviously I should have taken the trip to England. Oh well,
n'importe. Spilled milk and all that.
6. I say "we," but I have little knowledge of who sets things up, though I have taken part in
some of the planning. The K-CONs do not have, as far as I know, any corporate structure or officers;
it is just a bunch of folks continuing them from year to year. With great success, let me add.
7. EDITH PIAF, La Vie En Rose, in CHANSONS PARISIENNES (Columbia Records 1949).
8. I discussed some aspects of this in Peter Linzer, Contract as Evil, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 971 (2015),
at the wonderful symposium that Hastings Law School gave to honor Chuck Knapp's fifty years of
[Vol. 48:277
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many of us have written on the serious substantive issue of adhesion
contracts that force consumers into compulsory arbitration and
simultaneously prevent them from banding together to bring class actions
against companies who are accused of ripping off millions of individuals in
amounts too small to justify even going to small claims court.
This has largely been due to a Supreme Court that has read the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) in ways that were not intended when it was enacted
and that were unimaginable to Congress in 1925. To my mind, the FAA is
a judge-made, not Congress-made, law. The Congress that passed it in 1925
was dealing with business-to-business disputes and what was then viewed as
a progressive alternative to full-fledged trials. It understood the federal
commerce power narrowly-the New Deal expansion beginning in NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.9 would not take place for twelve more years.
And it understood diversity of citizenship litigation to be governed, as it had
been for more than eighty years, by the "federal common law" of Swift v.
Tyson.'° It would be thirteen years before Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins"
would overrule Swift and make state law govern diversity cases.1 2 Thus, the
Congress that passed the FAA did so in a legal world that has not been in
existence since before most of us were born. Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court has expanded the FAA without much regard for what Congress
meant. The initial cases giving the FAA a strong role were decided by liberal
justices trying to protect a progressive procedural device, 3 but in recent
years it has been expanded to cover diversity cases and consumer and
franchisee cases,"4 and to prevent states from protecting consumers by
restricting compulsory arbitration in adhesion contracts.15 While there was
some hope of convincing the Supreme Court that it had taken a wrong
approach, the more promising route appeared to me to be through
teaching law.
9. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
10. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
11. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
12. Id. at 78.
13. See, in particular, Justice Abe Fortas's opinion for the Court in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conk,'n Manufacturing Co., where Fortas deferred questions on fraud in the inducement to arbitration
unless the alleged fraud concerned the arbitration clause itself. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood Conklin
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967).
14. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-16 (1984) (holding the California Franchise
Investment Law could not invalidate arbitration clauses in franchise contracts without violating the
FAA and the Supremacy Clause).
15. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339-40, 352 (2011) (reaffirming the
FAA's power of preemption and abrogating a California state law protecting consumers against
arbitration in unconscionable contracts, including contracts of adhesion).
20161
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administrative law, particularly through the actions of the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), the product of the labors of former
contracts professor Senator Elizabeth Warren. 6 A court was likely to
approach the problem from a classical contract bias, focusing more on the
duty to read than the fairness of the transaction, and was likely to continue
to feel bound by what it perceived, wrongly to my mind, as the intention of
Congress to erect a strong wall around all kinds of arbitrations, not just those
negotiated by sophisticated businesses dealing with each other. But it was
Congress that gave the CFPB the authority to study compulsory pre-dispute
consumer arbitration, to report on it to Congress, and, if justified by its
study, to regulate or even ban these arbitrations."7 After making exhaustive
studies, the Bureau has proposed a ban on the use of arbitration clauses to
prevent consumer class actions," and Professor Jean Sternlight carefully
shows why she strongly supports the proposal.1 9 I fully agree with her, but
the downside of regulation by an administrative agency is that a change in
administrations can, as it is likely to do here, produce an abandonment of
an earlier administrative ruling. Whether the CFPB can get its regulation
into law before January 20, 2017 is beyond my knowledge. If it cannot, the
proposed regulation will probably be crippled by President Trump. That is
the problem with reform by administrative agencies-what one
administration giveth, the next can take away, and that may well happen
here. Professor Ramona Lampley apparently would prefer this result
because she sees small arbitrations as valuable to consumers, and urges that
they should be given a chance.20  But compulsory pre-dispute consumer
arbitration has been around for decades, and the CFPB showed that it has
hardly ever been used; companies typically settled consumer claims or
allowed them to be brought in small claims court.2  They used the clauses
almost exclusively as a firewall against consumer class actions.22 Professor
16. Eric J. Mogilnicki & Melissa S. Malpass, The First Year of the Consumer FinancialProtection Bureau:
An Overview, 68 BUS. LAW. 557, 557 (2013).
17. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5518 (2012 &
Supp. 2015).
18. Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32,830, 32,830 (proposed May 24,2016) (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1040) [hereinafter Arbitration Agreements].
19. Jean R. Sternlight, Hurrah for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Consumer Arbitration as a
Poster Childfor Rgulation, 48 ST. MARY'S L.J. 343 (2016)
20. Ramona L. Lampley, The CFPB Anti-Arbitration Proposal: Let's Just Give Arbitration a Chance., 48
ST. MARY'S L.J. 313 (2016).
21. See Arbitration Agreements, supra note 18, at 32,845 (finding that 32.2% of cases sent to
arbitration were decided on the merits while 57.4% settled, either formally or informally).
22. See id. at 32,830 ("[Plre-dispute arbitration agreements are being widely used to prevent
consumers from seeking relief from legal violations on a class basis.").
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Lampley's attempt to show that it was more convenient and cheaper for a
consumer to go to arbitration than to sue in small claims court was not very
convincing, at least not to me. Concededly, I am not unbiased on this issue.
The other finance industry challenge to the CFPB's proposal to ban the use
of arbitration clauses as defenses to consumer class actions was in the form
of "it's my football and I'll take it home if you don't let me score a
touchdown." The industry said it would give up consumer arbitrations
altogether if it could not use them against consumer class actions.23
Professor Richard Frankel had the rather easy task of showing how empty
this threat was, and he did the job very well.2 4 Consumers do not want
arbitration and finance companies do not use it except in class actions. If
there was a demand for consumer arbitration, consumers would ask for it,
and some finance companies would offer it for its competitive public
relations value. There have been so few plain vanilla small amount
consumer arbitrations over the past years that the industry's threat is
laughable.Eight months after K-CON XI came the 2016 Election, making
the future of the CFPB and Supreme Court rethinking look pretty dim right
now. It is not going to be easy avoiding the view of contract as every man
for himself-we are all equals in contract, even if I have the power and
expertise and you do not. I think that even if the political climate has
changed it is imperative we keep discussing the role of money and power in
consumer affairs and other contracts between large businesses and small
people. This is the time to talk about power and contract and to talk about
doing something about it. I doubt whether we will ever reach "La Vie En
Rose." But we could move closer to it and protect the vulnerable from the
worst sides of contract. That will require organizing and harnessing public
opinion between now and the 2018 and 2020 elections. It might just
succeed. It would be a great blessing if we can accomplish at least some of
it.
23. See Yuka Hayashi & Christina Rexrode, Proposed Rule WouldAllow Consumer to Sue Banks, Credit-
Card Companies, WALL STREETJ. (May 5, 2016, 1:40 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/cfpb-unveils-
proposed-rule-to-let-consumers-sue-banks-credit-card-companies-1462420862 (stating the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce warned that the proposed rule would cause companies to stop using arbitration
clauses altogether).
24. Richard Frankel, 'What We Lose in Sales, We Make Up in Volume:" The Fauly Logic ofthe Financial
Services Industy's Response to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's Proposed Rule Prohihifing Class Action
Bans inAritralion Clauses, 48 ST. MARY'S L.J. 283 (2016).
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